Page 249 - Proceeding 2015
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ANDRONICEANU Armenia and OHANYAN Gurgen                  FAMP
                                       IMF POLICIES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON EDUCATION IN ROMANIA             CCASP



                              The solution to surmount this issue is offered by Garuda (2000), who uses propensity scores to group
                              countries based on their economic performance and probability to apply for IMF financial assistance.
                              Furthermore,  employing  propensity score  method  in  evaluation  IMF  program effects on  employment
                   PROCEEDINGS OF THE 11 TH  ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
                              within the EU, it is found that Romania has similar pre-economic conditions, i.e. closest propensity scores
                              to  apply  for  IMF  programs  in  2009.  Meanwhile,  Romania  turned  to  the  IMF  in  2009  and  Bulgarian

                              authorities abstained. This evidence reduces availability of selection bias, as those two countries had
                              economic conditions alike. Thus, in evaluating IMF program effects on Romanian education we employ
                              Bulgaria as “control group”.


                              In general, data on analysis of education sector include input and output variables, where input variables
                              are public expenditures on different levels of education and its share in GDP and public budget. Yet,
                              output variables illustrate the efficiency of such expenditures on education such as enrollment of students,

                              out-of-school children number. In this end, we have made comparison both input and output variables in
                              Romania and Bulgaria to understand the sway of IMF programs on Romanian education.
                        30 th  – 31 st  October 2015  ”Strategic Management for Local Communities”   Bucharest   cutting budget deficit, shrinkage of public jobs and wage increase limitations. Those IMF measures on
                              It should be noted, that input variables have been under indirect influence of IMF measures such as



                              Romania during the crisis and after are comprehensively discussed in the following chapter. In order to
                              eliminate problems related with differences between statistical methodologies of distinct sources. We

                              have based just on Eurostat databases, which provide data till 2012.


                              5. DISCUSSION OF  IMF PROGRAM EFFECTS ON EDUCATION IN ROMANIA


                              Romania since 2009 has signed three SBAs with IMF, where the last two ones have been declared as
                                         3
                              precautionary.  Due to data limitation we discuss further SBAs signed in 2009 and 2011 each respectively
                              with 24 month duration (see Table 2).


                              Particularly, the IMF officials need to review Romanian government performance on quarterly basis.
                              Hence, we have analyzed 16 overall reviews by the IMF staff and extracted the reforms or measures that
                              directly or indirectly could influence Romanian education sector.


                                                 TABLE 2 - DESCRIPTION OF ROMANIAN STAND-BY ARRANGEMENTS
                               Approval Date   Initial End Date   Revised End Date   Total Access   Precautionary  Delayed By
                               05/04/2009    05/03/2011    03/30/2011       11.4 SDR mln.   No
                               03/31/2011    03/30/2013    06/30/2013       3.1 SDR mln.   Yes         3 to 6 months
                                                             Source: IMF MONA database


                              3  Precautionary arrangements are used when countries do not intend to draw on approved amounts, but retain the
                              option to do so should they need it.


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